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Industrial Development Bonds: A Proposal for Reform
Municipalities in recent years have increasingly used tax-
exempt industrial development bonds to finance the construc-
tion of facilities for private enterprise.' In addition, cities have
increasingly financed less traditional types of industrial devel-
opment bond projects. 2 This widespread issuance of tax-ex-
empt bonds has had a significant impact on federal revenues.
Government sources estimate that nearly $1 billion in federal
revenues will be lost in 1981.3 Because tax exemption confers a
public subsidy on the beneficiary of the bonds, these financing
practices have recently attracted widespread public attention.4
1. The annual volume of industrial development bond sales reached $100
million for the first time in 1960. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PRELIMINARY
DRAFT OF SMALL ISSUE INDusTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS 8 (October 1980)
[hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY DRAFT]. Between 1960 and 1968, when the
Revenue Adjustment Act changed the federal tax structure for industrial devel-
opment bonds, the annual volume of sales rose from $100 million to $1.8 billion.
Id. at 10. Estimates indicate that by 1979, sales of small issue industrial devel-
opment bonds alone had reached $7 billion. Id. at 16.
2. Industrial development bonds were originally used as a means to stim-
ulate manufacturing investment. PREIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 1, at 23. Now
many states permit the use of industrial development bonds for both industrial
and commercial projects. Id. As a result of this expansion, a greater variety of
activities have been eligible for industrial development bond financing. A pre-
liminary Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study listed several of these "less
traditional" uses of industrial development bonds:
1. Commercial Real Estate Development.... shopping centers,
... corporate headquarters... new branch bank offices... office
building and equipment purchases, including art work and stereo-
phonic sound.
2. Retail Stores.... department stores, drugstores, supermar-
kets, grocery stores, restaurants, ice cream parlors, fast food chains
and automobile dealerships.
3. Recreational Facilities.... including movie theaters, country
clubs, skating rinks, bowling alleys, tennis and racquetball clubs,
health clubs and golf courses.
4. Tourist facilities .... hotels, motels, beach resorts, ski lodges.
5. Health Facilities .... proprietary (for-profit) hospitals and
nursing homes.
Id. at 23-24.
3. See PRELImNARY DRAr, supra note 1, at 58.
4. See, e.g., The Controversy Over Industrial Revenue Bonds Heats Up
Again, DuN's REV., Sept. 1980, at 70-72 [hereinafter cited as Controversy];
Greene, No Free Lunch, FORBES, Aug. 4, 1980, at 69; Hertzberg, On The
Bondwagon: Use of Tax-Exempt Financing for Stores And Other Business
Soars, Stirring Critics, Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1980, at 56, col. 1; O'Shea, Development
Bond Use is Expanding; So is Controversy, Chi. Tribune, Nov. 2, 1980, § 5, at 1,
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Minnesota municipalities have mirrored the trend toward
greater use of tax-exempt industrial development bonds and
have widened the scope of projects eligible for such financing.5
In 1979, however, the Minnesota legislature, "concerned about
the recent uncontrolled proliferation of projects" 6 being
financed by these tax-exempt bonds,7 amended the Minnesota
Municipal Industrial Development Act (the Act).8 The amend-
col. 4; Samuelson, Industrial Revenue Bonds-Economic Boon or Public Ripoff.7,
NAT'L J., Oct. 10, 1980, at 1749-52.
This issue has also attracted the attention of the Oversight Subcommittee
of the United States House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee,
which announced that it will schedule hearings on industrial development
bonds in the 1981 session of Congress. Florida Democrat Sam Gibbons, Chair
of the Oversight Subcommittee, stated, "I am concerned about the growth in
the use of [industrial development bonds] and the shift in emphasis from fac-
tories to fast foods. The most alarming thing is that the government doesn't
know how much it is losing as a result of the bond boom." Controversy, supra,
at 70. At the request of this committee, an extensive study of industrial devel-
opment bonds has been undertaken by the Congressional Budget Office. See
PRELMINARY DRAFT, supra note 1.
5. In Minnesota, where a total of $673 million of industrial development
bonds were issued in 1979, projects that received such financing included sup-
per clubs, shopping centers, bowling alleys, bank branches, dentist offices, aid
raquetball clubs. See generally Minnesota Dep't of Econ. Dev., Municipal Reve:
nue Bonds Annual Report: 1979 (on file with the Minnesota Law Review). In
1976, a total of $115 million of industrial development bonds were issued in Min-
nesota. Id. at 13.
6. Ridgewood Dev. Co. v. State, 294 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Minn. 1980). In
Ridgewood, a company sought to finance its development of residential real es-
tate property with approximately $30 million of municipal industrial develop-
ment revenue bonds. Id. In 1978, two similar projects secured bond financing
for approximately $45 million and $6.6 million each. See Minnesota Dep't of
Econ. Dev., Municipal Revenue Bonds Annual Report: 1977-1978 at 7-8 (on fie
with the Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Annual Report]. The
average amount of municipal revenue bonds issued to industrial and commer-
cial projects during 1978 was, however, only approximately $1.6 million per pro-
ject. Id. at 9. This differential between the average amount of bonds issued for
projects and the disproportionately large amount of bonding secured by resi-
dential projects contributed to the legislature's specific concern with residential
real estate development projects receiving industrial development bonding.
7. When a municipality issues municipal industrial development bonds,
the municipality typically acquires property and constructs a building to be
leased or conveyed under a revenue agreement to private interests. See 15 E.
McQuiLAN, MuvicnAL CORPORATIONS § 43.32a (3d ed. 1970). The Minnesota
Municipal Industrial Development Act provides that the revenue agreement
"may be in the form of a lease, mortgage, direct or installment sale contract,
loan agreement, take or pay or similar agreement." MIN. STAT. § 474.02(7)
(1980). One of the principal features of these revenue bonds is that the interest
paid on the bonds is tax-exempt. See MIN. STAT. § 474.12 (1980).
8. Act of June 1, 1979, ch. 306, §§ 10-13, 1979 MiNN. LAws 797 (codified at
MINN. STAT. §§ 474.01-.14 (1980)). The legislature described the amendment as
"[a]n Act relating to municipal development; limiting the objects and methods




ment accomplished two purposes: first, it excluded certain
types of projects from receiving industrial development bonds, 9
and second, it prescribed a mandatory procedure that a munici-
pality must follow when it contemplates issuing industrial de-
velopment bonds.10 Problems with the use of industrial
development bonds still remain, however, because the legisla-
ture failed to address effectively the use of ad-hoc municipal
decision making that is responsible for many of the present
abuses in tax-exempt industrial development financing."
Moreover, the problems created by the lack of formal decision
making procedures are exacerbated by the vague requirement
that industrial development bonds serve a public purpose,12
and by restrained judicial review of municipal expenditures
under the public purpose requirement.13
This Note will examine the solutions available to control
the rapidly increasing abuses of industrial development bonds.
First, it will demonstrate the inappropriateness of using legisla-
tive standards to limit the substantive discretion extended to
municipalities under the Minnesota Municipal Industrial De-
velopment Act. It will then show the inadequacy of deferential
judicial review to determine whether an expenditure of public
funds is legally permissible. Finally, this Note will suggest a
proposal for legislative reform that would resolve many of the
problems remaining after the Minnesota legislature's recent
amendment of the Act. Under this proposal municipalities
9. Specifically, the term "project" was redefined to exclude "any property
to be sold or to be affixed to or consumed in the production of property for sale,
and... any housing facility to be rented or used as a permanent residence."
Act of June 1, 1979, ch. 306, § 11, 1979 MrNN. LAws 797 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 474.02 (1d) (1980). At the same time that the legislature prohibited housing
facilities from being financed with industrial development revenue bonds under
Chapter 474, the legislature enacted Chapter 462C, which authorizes cities to
"develop and administer programs of making or purchasing mortgage loans to
finance the acquisition of single family housing by low and moderate income
persons." Act of June 1, 1979, ch. 306, § 1, 1979 MINN. LAws 797 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 462C.01 (1980)). To finance these programs, the legislature authorized
the issuance and sale of revenue bonds. MINN. STAT. § 462C.07 (1980). The pur-
pose of this change was to remove the financing of housing from the Industrial
Development Act, where the legislature felt that the broad discretion of the Act
was being abused by the financing of housing projects that did not serve a pub-
lic purpose, yet to permit the financing of housing projects when they complied
with the stricter public purpose constraints incorporated into the new legisla-
tion. Telephone Interview with Minnesota State Representative William
Schreiber (Jan. 21, 1981).
10. See MINN. STAT. § 474.01(7b) (1980).
11. See notes 85-86 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 45-50 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 52-54 infra and accompanying text.
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would be required to institute local procedures for evaluating
industrial development bond projects.14 The objective of this
reform is to reduce arbitrary industrial development bond ap-
provals by promoting procedural consistency in local decision
making and also by facilitating effective judicial review of those
determinations.
I. STATE LEGISLATIVE STANDARDS: AN
INAPPROPRIATE SOLUTION
One method to control the expenditures made by munici-
palities is for the legislature to adopt substantive standards
that would limit by statute the types of projects eligible for in-
dustrial development bond financing.1S For example, a legisla-
ture might determine that rental housing as a class is not
eligible for industrial development bonds,' 6 or that hotels and
motels as a class are eligible for such bonds.'7 A number of
states have adopted this approach.18
Although the legislative standards approach has some ad-
vantages, such as producing predictable results, being easy to
administer, and reducing the number of projects financed with
bonds,19 there are several reasons why this approach is unde-
sirable. First, the legislative standards approach is inconsistent
with the purpose of the Minnesota Municipal Industrial Devel-
opment Act, which expresses a legislative preference for local
14. This recommendation has its source in Bruff, Judicial Review in Local
Government Law: A Reappraisal, 60 Mmn. L REv. 669 (1976). Bruff urges
courts to force local governments to conform their decision-making process to a
system similar to that embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976). Bruff, supra, at 695-98. This Note applies Bruff's pro-
posal, with some modifications, to the specific municipal decision making in-
volved in industrial development bonding. Bruf's proposal may also be
suitable for application in other areas of municipal decision making.
15. Legislative standards are "defined simply as the substantive resolution
of important policy issues by legislation." Bruff, supra note 14, at 680; see
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970); cf. Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972) (patent standards require congressional determi-
nation, for that is the only way to resolve conflicting views); Friend v. Northern
Trust Co., 314 111. App. 596, 603, 42 N.E.2d 330, 334 (1942) (question of what shall
constitute grounds for divorce is one of public policy and is for legislature to
decide).
16. See note 7 supra.
17. See MnN. STAT. § 474.02 (lb) (1980).
18. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 69-1501(e) (Supp. 1980) (defining "project");
Ky. RE V. STAT. § 103.200 (Supp. 1980) (defining "building" or "industrial build-
ing"); see note 9 supra and accompanying text.
19. The advantages associated with the legislative standards approach
stem from its ability to provide a single, substantive, statutory standard that
must be complied with by all local governments throughout a state.
[Vol. 65:961
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action.20 The Act declares that "[i]t is the policy of the state to
facilitate and encourage action by local government units to
prevent the economic deterioration of such areas.
'21 By en-
couraging local action through this provision of the Act, the leg-
islature recognized that local conditions vary and that city hall
might provide a better vantage point than the state legislature
for identifying and curing these local conditions.
22 The legisla-
tive standards mechanism is incompatible with local action be-
cause it attempts to force industrial development bond
expenditures into a predetermined set of legislatively sanc-
tioned projects.23 Because this system restricts the ability of
municipalities to rectify troublesome local conditions, it frus-
trates the Act's purpose of encouraging local government ac-
tion.24
In addition, the legislative standards method is contrary to
the concept of home rule, a doctrine under which a state consti-
tution grants a city the authority to draft and adopt a charter
for its own government. 25 Although recent developments, par-
ticularly in land use planning, have restrained municipalities'
exercise of home rule powers in some contexts,
26 the principles
20. See MINN. STAT. § 474.01(2) (1980).
21. Id.
22. Bruff, supra note 14, at 681; see, e.g., Boise Redevelopment Agency v.
Yick Kung Corp., 94 Idaho 876, 885, 499 P.2d 575, 584 (1972); Hawkins v. City of
Greenfield, 248 Ind. 593, 602, 230 N.E.2d 396, 401 (1967); Inganamort v. Borough
of Fort Lee, 62 N.J. 521, 528-29, 303 A.2d 298, 302 (1973); 1 J. SUTHERLAND, STAT-
UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4.07 (4th ed. C. Sands 1972).
Since cities have a better vantage point, they are "vested with broad discre-
tion in determining whether particular projects serve a public purpose." R.E.
Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 338 (Minn. 1978).
23. Bruff, supra note 14, at 681. Bruff notes that the "confining effect of leg-
islative standards is increased by the operation of Dillon's rule, which enjoins
strict construction of statutory delegations of power to cities." Id. at 681 n.63;
see notes 42-44 infra and accompanying text.
24. MINN. STAT. § 474.01(2) (1980); see text accompanying note 21 supra.
Even if legislative standards were more generalized, such as to prescribe
that X jobs must accompany each million dollars of bonding, the same argu-
ments as those pertaining to specific legislative standards would be applicable.
Moreover, for generalized standards to be workable, they would have to encom-
pass all of the various types of projects possible under industrial development
bonding. Once such general standards were imposed, it would be mandatory
that applications fulfilling those requirements be granted industrial develop-
ment bonding. Thus, local governments would be stripped of all decision-mak-
ing discretion.
25. The Minnesota Constitution provides that "[a]ny local government
unit when authorized by law may adopt a home rule charter for its govern-
ment." MINN. CONST. art. 12, § 4; accord, CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 8; MICH. CONST.
art. 7, § 22; N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 2; WIs. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
26. In land use planning there has been a trend toward state or regional
control as contrasted with local control. See, e.g., Rose, Conflict Between Re-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of home rule remain valid,27 especially within the context of in-
dustrial development bonding. Although home rule advocates
have advanced different rationales for the doctrine over the
years, recent proponents have urged the adoption of home rule
as a method to increase local government's power to solve the
problems of urbanization, a goal similar to that articulated in
the Minnesota Municipal Industrial Development Act.28 Legis-
lative standards for industrial development bonds, however,
contradict the local control concept of hoine rule by requiring a
municipality to undertake only those projects authorized by
the legislature.29
Finally, a system favoring legislative standards would inev-
itably inhibit municipal approval of creative industrial develop-
ment bond projects.3 0 Municipal studies might indicate, for
example, that economic deterioration caused by transporta-
gionalism and Home Rule: The Ambivalence of Recent Planning Law Deci-
sions, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 8, 18, 20-21 (1978); Schnidman, The Courts Enter the
Zoning Game: Will Local Governments Win or Lose?, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
590, 606 (1975).
Minnesota has recently implemented a broad range of legislation allowing
state administrative agencies to preempt and supervise local land use regula-
tion. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. §§ 4.10-.36 (1980) (State Planning Agency); id.
§§ 462.381-.398 (regional development commissions); see Note, State Interven-
tion into Local Land Use Regulation-A Proposal for Reform of Minnesota Leg-
islation, 63 MIN. L. REV. 1259, 1259 (1979) (proposing that the American Law
Institute's Model Land Development Code "be used as a guide to the formation
of legislation that would eliminate interagency conflict" caused by recent legis-
lation attempting "to ensure that local land use decisions reflect state and re-
gional interests").
27. See, e.g., Gotherman, Municipal Home Rule in Ohio, 8 CAPrrAL UJ.
REV. 243, 262 (1978) (suggesting that home rule in Ohio is "a viable legal and
political doctrine"); Howard, Home Rule in Georgia: An Analysis of State and
Local Power, 9 GA. L. REV. 757, 757-58, 773-78 (1975) (interpreting a recently
adopted constitutional amendment as giving "local governments a degree of
self-government far exceeding that previously granted to them under home
rule"); Comment, A New Approach to Home Rule in Illinois-County of Cook v.
John Sexton Contractors Co., 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 603, 612-15 (1980) (suggesting
that a recent decision by the Illinois Supreme Court indicates that the court
"has overcome its reluctance to construe the powers of a home rule unit
broadly in accordance with the spirit of the Illinois Constitution").
28. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 27, at 604 and n.6 (stating that the 1970
Illinois constitutional convention's primary purpose for adopting home rule was
to help local governments solve urban problems); see notes 20-22 supra and ac-
companying text.
29. See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
30. See Bruff, supra note 14, at 681. See generally Sailors v. Board of Educ.
of the County of Kent, 387 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1967) ("Viable local governments
may need many innovations, numerous combinations of old and new devices,
great flexibility in municipal arrangements to meet changing urban condi-
tions."); N. LrrLEFIELD, METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS AND MuNIcIPAL HoME
RULE 8-9 (1962) (strict state control has historically prevented creative ap-
proach to local problems).
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tional difficulties could be remedied only by multi-use projects
that combined industrial and residential uses. 31 The amend-
ment to the Minnesota Municipal Industrial Development Act,
however, would prohibit such a project.32 Thus, substantive
legislative standards might prevent a municipality from select-
ing the best solution for a local problem.33
An analysis of the legislative standards approach demon-
strates the importance of giving local governments the discre-
tion to respond to distinctive local conditions. Past practice
illustrates, however, that nothing is more subject to abuse than
discretionary decision making.34 A system of judicial review
may curb this abuse by permitting the essential element of dis-
cretion in local government decision making, while providing
the necessary control over such discretion.
II. TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW:
AN INADEQUATE SOLUTION
Judicial review of industrial development bonding occurs
primarily when a municipality sanctions such bond financing
for a project.35 As a result, deferential judicial review does not
greatly decrease the risk of authorizing projects that have been
arbitrarily or capriciously approved by a municipality. In addi-
tion, the modern trend of courts to construe liberally36 the re-
quirement that such projects serve a "public purpose" allows
more projects to qualify for tax-exempt financing than have
qualified in the past.37
When reviewing industrial development bonding decisions,
courts apply three distinct doctrines: the delegation doctrine,
Dillon's rule, and the public purpose doctrine. Under the dele-
31. See generally J. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN Crr-
rxs 152-77 (1961).
32. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
33. See Bruff, supra note 14, at 681.
34. See, e.g., notes 1-13 supra and accompanying text.
35. See generally R.E. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331
(Minn. 1978); City of Pipestone v. Madsen, 287 Minn. 357, 178 N.W.2d 594 (1970);
Port Auth. v. Fisher, 275 Minn. 157, 145 N.W.2d 560 (1966).
36. See, e.g., R.E. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 337
(Minn. 1978) (" 'public purpose' should be broadly construed to comport with
the changing conditions of modern life"). See generally Katz v. Brandon, 156
Conn. 521, 532-33, 245 A.2d 579, 586 (1968); New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth.
v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 457, 478, 292 A.2d 580, 592 (1971); State ex rel Taft v.
Campanella, 50 Ohio St. 2d 242, 244-45, 364 N.E.2d 21, 23 (1977); In re Advisory
Opinion to Governor, 113 R.L 586, 594, 324 A.2d 641, 646 (1974).
37. See Note, Determining Permissible Municipal Expenditures: The Public
Purpose Doctrine Revived, 7 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 225, 226 (1973).
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gation doctrine, courts examine the delegating statute for con-
stitutional validity.38 Modem delegation doctrine recognizes
the necessity for legislatures to delegate power to municipali-
ties;39 the only requirement is that the delegating legislation
contain standards to guide the exercise of power by cities.40
Because of the effect of Dillon's rule, however, these standards
have not prevented cities from exercising power arbitrarily.
Many courts apply Dillon's rule to determine "whether the
local exercise of power is within the terms of the delegating
statute."41 This rule requires strict construction of statutory
delegations, and denial of a municipality's power to act if any
doubt exists concerning its validity.42 Responding to overly
38. See, e.g., In re Garrison Diversion Conservancy Dist., 144 N.W.2d 82, 91-
93 (N.D. 1966); City of Milwaukeey. Sewerage Comm'n, 268 Wis. 342, 349-51, 67
N.W.2d 624, 628-29 (1954). -- "
39. In its traditional form, the delegation doctrine held "that power vested
by the constitution in the legislature may not be delegated." Bruff supra note
14, at 678; see, e.g., People ex rel. Chicago Dryer Co. v. City of Chicago, 413 Ill.
315, 320, 109 N.E.2d 201, 204 (1952). See generally 2 E. McQurLAN, MUICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §§ 4.08-.09 (3d ed. 1979).
The policies underlying this traditional view of the doctrine were two-fold:
'Tirst, protection against arbitrariness through the prevention of undue concen-
tration of power in one branch of government; second, functional efficiency
through the allocation of tasks to the branches of government best suited to ex-
ercise them." Bruff, supra note 14, at 678 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Opinion
of the Justices, 110 N.H. 359, 362-63, 266 A.2d 823, 825-26 (1970); David v. Vesta
Co., 45 N.J. 301, 321-25, 212 A.2d 345, 355-58 (1965).
40. See Members of the Jamestown School Comm. v. Schmidt, 405 A.2d 16,
23-24 (R.L 1979); Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 66, 578 P.2d
1309, 313 (1978). See generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAw TREATISE
§§ 2.01-.15 (1958 & Supp. 1970); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATrvE
AcTION 32-34, 73-85 (abr. ed. 1965). These standards may be so specific as to
cause rigidity, or so broad as to be only "platitudinous requirements that the
delegate advance the public ... health, safety, and welfare." Bruff; supra note
14, at 682. Dillion's rule has the effect, however, of producing broad standards
as opposed to specific standards. See notes 54-55 infra and accompanying text.
41. Bruff, supra note 14, at 669; see, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Arizona Sash,
Door & Glass Co., 80 Ariz. 100, 102-03, 293 P.2d 438, 439 (1956); City of Osceola v.
Whistle, 241 Ark. 604, 605-06, 410 S.W.2d 393, 394 (1966); Father Basil's Lodge,
Inc. v. City of Chicago, 393 Ill. 246, 250-53, 65 N.E.2d 805, 810-12 (1946).
42. Dillon's rule is as follows:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no
others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily
or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third,
those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and pur-
poses of the corporation,-not simply convenient, but indispensable.
Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of
power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power
is denied.
1 L DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th
ed. 1911) (emphasis in original). This rule favoring state sovereignty received
its most famous expression by Judge John F. Dillon in City of Clinton v. Cedar
[Vol. 65:961
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technical applications of the rule by courts,4 3 legislatures have
delegated broad powers to cities without meaningful guidelines
for implementation.44 Thus, the effect of Dillon's rule has been
to expand local power rather than to confine it.
Finally, the satisfaction of state and federal public purpose
provisions 45 requires that funds be expended only for public
purposes. 4 6 This requirement is not, however, susceptible to
Rapids & Missouri River R.R., 24 Iowa 455 (1868). See Note, Home Rule in Penn-
sylvania, 81 Dic. L. REV. 265, 266-79 (1977).
Dillon's rule, which was widely adopted by courts in the early twentieth
century as a rule of statutory construction, later functioned like a rule of consti-
tutional interpretation in the context of home rule powers. See id.; Michael &
Norton, Home Rule in Illinois: A Functional Analysis, 1978 U. IL. L.F. 559, 559-
63 (Dillon's rule remains applicable to some delegations of power under the Ili-
nois constitution); Note, Dillon Rule-A Limit on Local Government Powers, 41
Mo. L REV. 546, 547-48, 568-69 (1976) (noting that Dillon's rule, with minor alter-
ations, has been adopted in almost every state, and remains applicable despite
widespread criticism by contemporary observers that the rule is "an archaic
and unrealistic limit on city powers"). See generally Serbine, Municipal Pow-
ers, in 24 MINN. STAT. ANN. 73, 78-79 (1958); 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTEs AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 64.02 (4th ed. C. Sands 1974).
43. See generally 1 C. ANTIEAU, MuNicnAL CORPORATIoN LAw §§ 5.01-.06
(1975); F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT IN URBAN
AREAS 254 (1970 & Supp. 1972); S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL
GovENm ENT LAw 91-92 (1970).
44. See Bruff, supra note 14, at 687. Delegations to cities often include
"general welfare" clauses which grant a general power to legislate without spe-
cific statutory authority. See, e.g., 1 C. ANTEU, supra note 43, § 5.07 ("The diffi-
culty in making specific enumeration of all such powers as may be properly
delegated to municipal corporations renders it necessary to confer such power
in general terms." (footnote omitted)). Compare 6 E. McQUILAN, supra note
7, §§ 24.43-.44 ("[C]ourts uniformly regard [general welfare clauses] as ample
authority for a reasonable exercise ... of a broad and varied municipal activity
to protect the health, morals, peace and good order of the community, [and] to
promote its welfare in trade, commerce, industry, and manufacture." (footnote
omitted)) with MINN. STAT. § 474.01(2) (1977) ('The welfare of the state re-
quires the active promotion .., and development of economically sound indus-
try... through governmental action for the purpose of preventing, so far as
possible, the emergence of blighted and marginal lands and areas of chronic
unemployment.").
45. See, e.g., People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin, 53 Ill. 2d 347, 354-56,
291 N.E.2d 807, 812 (1972); Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 256 Iowa 1184, 1196-97,
131 N.W.2d 5, 16-17 (1964); City of Gaylord v. Beckett, 378 Mich. 273, 298-99, 144
N.W.2d 460, 470-71 (1966) (cases collected at 469 n.9); City of Pipestone v. Mad-
sen, 287 Minn. 357, 363-64, 178 N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (1970).
46. For the evolution of the public purpose doctrine in federal constitu-
tional law, see generally Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495
(1937) (upholding the Alabama State Unemployment Compensation Act as an
exercise of the taxing power of the state to effect a public purpose); Milheim v.
Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 262 U.S. 710 (1923) (upholding the public
purpose claim for bonds sold to finance the cost of a tunnel); Green v. Frazier,
253 U.S. 233 (1920) (upholding the public purpose claim for legislation creating
a state industrial commission to operate several business enterprises); Jones v.
1981]
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precise definition,47 and the tests fashioned by the courts to de-
cide whether a municipal expenditure serves a public purpose
reflect this imprecision.4 8 These vague standards invest consid-
erable discretion in municipalities to determine the propriety
of expenditures,4 9 without prescribing effective guidelines to di-
rect municipal decision makers.
To determine whether an expenditure of public funds, such
as municipal bonding, is for a public purpose, courts have used
various indicia.5 0 The extent of the judicial deference afforded
one factor, the expression of approval by the municipal legisla-
tive body,51 illustrates the extensive discretion that courts per-
mit municipalities to exercise.52 The lack of logic underlying
such deference is evident: "an express desire to spend munici-
City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917) (upholding the public purpose claim for the
establishment of a municipal coal and fuel yard which would sell fuel at cost).
The public purpose requirement of federal law has been incorporated into
the Minnesota Constitution. See MINN. CONsT. art. 10, § 1; accord, ILL CONST.
art. 8, § 1(a); People ex rel. City of Urbana v. Paley, 68 I 2d 62, 69, 368 N.E.2d
915, 918 (1977); IOWA CONST. art. 3, § 31; Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Iowa
1969).
47. See, e.g., City of Pipestone v. Madsen, 287 Minn. 357, 364, 178 N.W.2d
594, 599 (1970); Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 184, 89 N.W.2d 635, 643 (1958);
15 E. McQunAN, supra note 7, § 39.19.
As a guideline, some courts have construed public purpose to mean "such
an activity as will serve as a benefit to the community as a body and which, at
the same time is directly related to the functions of government." R.E. Short
Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn. 1978) (quoting Visina v.
Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 184, 89 N.W.2d 635, 643 (1958)). Accord, State ex rel.
McClure v. Hagerman, 155 Ohio St. 320, 325, 98 N.E.2d 835, 838 (1951) (munici-
palities may spend public money for purposes conducive to the "public health,
safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity, and contentment of all the
inhabitants or residents").
48. See notes 50-54 infra and accompanying text.
49. See RE. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 338 (Minn.
1978). See generally Bell & Hinkle, A Guide to Industrial Revenue Bond Fi-
nancing, 9 WASHBuN L.J. 372, 373-74 (1970); Hester, Industrial Development
Bond Financing Under the Georgia Development Authorities Law, 14 GA. ST.
B.J. 10, 11-13 (1977); Mulcahy & Guszkowski, The Financing of Corporate Ex-
pansion Through Industrial Revenue Bonds, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 201, 210-11 (1974).
50. One commentator suggests that courts use six principal factors to de-
termine the propriety of municipal bonding- "Prior characterization, legislative
or voter approval, general economic benefit, competition with private enter-
prise, number of beneficiaries, and necessity because of infeasibility of private
performance." Note, supra note 37, at 227. The commentator rightly concludes
that most of these factors are not helpful in determining whether an expendi-
ture is a public purpose. See id. at 232-40.
51. See Note, supra note 37, at 234. It is important to recognize that a reve-
nue bond, such as those issued under the Minnesota Municipal Industrial De-
velopment Act, does not require approval by a general referendum. See MINN.
STAT. § 474.04 (1980).
52. See, e.g., R.E. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 337
(Minn. 1978) (courts "pay great deference to the initial legislative determina-
tion that a particular project serves a public purpose"). See also Opinion to the
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pal funds in a particular way [evidenced by a resolution of a
city council] by no means assures that the use is public."5 3 Ju-
dicial deference in these circumstances is reasonable only if it
is assumed that municipal decision making is performed in a
rational and nonarbitrary fashion. This assumption is un-
founded, however, because rationality and nonarbitrariness are
themselves the subject of the judicial inquiry.54
All three doctrines applied in judicial review-the delega-
tion doctrine, Dillon's rule, and the public purpose doctrine-
impede courts from preventing arbitrary municipal authoriza-
tion of industrial development bonds. For judicial review of in-
dustrial development bonds issues to be effective, there must
be constraints, not necessarily on substantive determinations,
but on local decision-making procedures. Because local govern-
ments, desiring to maintain their decision making indepen-
dence, would not be likely to comply voluntarily with
requirements that are imposed against only a few towns, judi-
cially imposed procedural requirements would not be likely to
succeed.5 5 A system of legislative reform, on the other hand,
could effectively constrain municipal decision making and yet
allow municipalities the opportunity to respond to local condi-
tions.
III. LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT BOND FINANCING
The procedural reforms enacted in the amendment to the
Minnesota Municipal Industrial Development Act56 substan-
tially enhance previous procedures by requiring a notice-and-
comment public hearing. The previous procedures only re-
Governor, 76 R.L 249, 258, 69 A.2d 531, 535 (1949); Hightower v. City of Raleigh,
150 N.C. 569, 571, 65 S.E. 279, 281 (1909).
53. Note, supra note 37, at 234.
54. Municipal expenditures have been overruled when "the primary object
[of the proposed use] is to promote some private end," City of Pipestone v.
Madsen, 287 Minn. 357, 365, 178 N.W.2d 594, 599 (1970) (quoting Burns v. Essling,
156 Minn. 171, 174, 194 N.W. 404, 405 (1923)), or when it is "clearly apparent that
[the municipality's determination] is without reasonable foundation," City of
Tulsa v. Williamson, 276 P.2d 209, 214 (Okla. 1954), or is "manifestly arbitrary
and incorrect." State ex rel. McClure v. Hagerman, 155 Ohio St. 320, 325, 98
N.E.2d 835, 838 (1951) (quoting 37 AM. Ju. MuNIcnAL CORPORATIONS § 120, at
735 (1941)).
55. See, e.g., R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING G ,E (1966). Babcock posits that
"[j] udicial surveillance of local [zoning] procedure under our present enabling
legislation is ineffectual. A reversal or remand by the courts because of sloppy
procedure before the board of appeals of Broadview has not, in my experience,
the slightest impact on the practices of neighboring Westchester." Id. at 156.
56. See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
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quired a municipality considering financing a project with in-
dustrial development bonds to submit a detailed application to
the Commissioner of Securities.5 7 The Act now requires, in ad-
dition to these procedures, that before submitting the applica-
tion to the Commissioner the municipality "conduct a public
hearing on the proposal to undertake and finance the pro-
ject."58 The Act specifies that notice be published of the time
and place of the hearing, the place and times for inspection of a
draft copy of the proposed application to the Commissioner of
57. In order to receive approval from the Commissioner of Securities the
municipality must submit the following information:
1. Name of firm
2. Nature and description of the firm's business
3. Scope of the project to be financed
4. Proposed term of the revenue agreement
5. Estimated dollar cost of project and allocation of bond proceeds
6. Estimated number of new jobs to be created
7. A resolution of the municipality giving preliminary approval to the
project
8. A letter of intent to purchase the bond issue from an underwriter
or an analysis of a fiscal consultant as to the feasibility of the pro-
ject from a financial standpoint
9. A comprehensive statement indicating how the project satisfies
the public purposes and policies of the Minnesota Industrial De-
velopment Act
10. A preliminary opinion of bond counsel as to the legality of the is-
sue
Minnesota Dep't of Econ. Dev., Municipal Revenue Bonds: An Explanation of
the Minnesota Industrial-Development Act of 1967, as amended 5-6 (July 1980)
(on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
Although these requirements appear to be quite stringent, the following ex-
cerpt from an application to the Commissioner of Securities to receive indus-
trial development bonding for a restaurant demonstrates that the
"comprehensive statement" of " public purposes and policies" submitted to the
Commissioner is little more than a restatement of the public policies outlined
in the Minnesota Industrial Development Act.
Representatives of the company estimate that, as a result of the ac-
quisition and construction of the Project, the Company will employ ap-
proximately one hundred (100) persons in the City and the
surrounding area, in addition to those currently employed by the com-
pany. The City Council is concerned about the level of unemployment
in the City and the surrounding area and the resulting movement of
persons to other areas where jobs are more plentiful, and believes that
the existence of the Project in the City would help alleviate those
problems....
Representatives of the Company estimate that the acquisition and
construction of the Project will result in an additional annual payroll of
approximately $225,000, based on wage rates currently in effect. The
City Council believes that a substantial percentage of that additional
payroll will be spent on housing, food and other goods and services in
the City and surrounding area, thus benefitting the local economy.
State of Minnesota, Dep't of Commerce, Application For Approval of Municipal
Industrial Revenue Bond Project (July 28, 1978) (submitted by J's Restaurants
International, Inc.) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
58. MmN. STAT. § 474.01 (Tb) (1980).
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Securities, and a statement of the "general nature" of the pro-
ject.59 At the hearing, the municipality must give "all parties
who appear... an opportunity to express their views with re-
spect to the proposal."60 Following completion of the public
hearing, the municipality must adopt "a resolution determining
whether or not to proceed with the project."6 1
All of these procedural reforms significantly increase the
openness of the decision-making process. More people have an
opportunity to participate in such proceedings; thus, more in-
terests can be represented. Although these procedures dimin-
ish the likelihood that municipalities will make arbitrary
decisions concerning industrial bond financing, additional ben-
efits can be derived from requiring a record of such proceed-
ings. 62
A. A MODEL FOR REFORM
The components of the legislative reform recommended for
industrial development bonding are a requirement that munici-
palities adopt local procedures for the decision-making process,
a requirement that all bond application proceedings be per-
formed on the record, and a legislative statement encouraging
municipalities to adopt local standards to assist in the decision-
making process.
1. Parameters of the Model
The primary goal of industrial development bond reform
should be to "provide a framework for principled decision-mak-
ing... [thereby] enhancing the integrity of the [decision-mak-




62. Four bills have recently been introduced in the Minnesota legislature
to further amend industrial development bonding law. Two of the bills propose
repeal of Minnesota Statutes § 474.02, subdivisions la & lb (1980). Minn. H.F.
No. 22, 72 Legis., 1981 Sess. § 1; Minn. S.F. No. 73, 72 Legis., 1981 Sess. § 1. These
bills would prohibit the use of industrial development bonds for commercial, as
distinguished from industrial, purposes. The other two bills impose additional
reporting requirements on municipalities, and require adoption of municipal
"operating guidelines." Minn. H.F. No. 268, 72 Legis., 1981 Sess. §§ 3,4; Minn.
S.F. No. 205, 72 Legis., 1981 Sess. §§ 3,4. These guidelines are statements of "the
authorized uses for municipal industrial revenue bonds within that municipal-
ity." Minn. H.F. No. 268, 72 Legis., 1981 Sess. § 3; Minn. S.F. No. 205, 72 Legis.,
1981 Sess. § 3.




requirement that municipalities adopt local procedures for the
issuance of industrial development bonds is essential.6 4 Such
procedures, by contributing to the fairness and openness of in-
dustrial development bond financing determinations, can help
eliminate arbitrary exercises of discretionary power by munici-
palities.65 Principles of procedural fairness require that an ap-
plicant for industrial development bonds know and have an
opportunity to respond to the information considered by the
municipality,66 as well as an explanation for the conclusions
reached.67 In addition, principles of openness require public
64. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADnisTRATVE LAw TExT § 4.03 (3d ed. 1972). An-
other area of municipal decision making that exhibits problems similar to those
of industrial development bonding is zoning. Babcock, noting that most zoning
altercations "are settled by crude tribal adaptations of medieval trial by fire" or
are "concluded by confused and ad hoc injunctions of bewildered courts," IL
BABCOCK, supra note 55, at 154, suggests that "[o]nly the legislature can pre-
scribe adequate rules for local administrative procedure and record-keeping."'
Id. at 156.
65. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1971)
(an ordinance which provided "no standards governing the exercise of the dis-
cretion granted by the ordinance ... permits and encourages an arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement of the law"); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., v.
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("To protect [fundamental per-
sonal interests] from administrative arbitrariness . . . [c]ourts should require
administrative officers to articulate the standards and principles that govern
their discretionary decisions in as much detail as possible."); Holmes v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968) ("It hardly need be said
that the existence of an absolute and uncontrolled discretion in an agency of
government vested with the administration of a vast program, such as public
housing, would be an intolerable invitation to abuse.... For this reason alone
due process requires that selections among applicants be made in accordance
with 'ascertainable standards.' "). See also K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
98-99 (1969); Garner, The Informal Actions of the Federal Government, 26 AM.
U.L. REv. 799, 802 (1977).
66. See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938) ('The right to a
hearing [-a fair and open hearing-] embraces not only the right to present
evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing
party and to meet them."); North Ala. Express, Inc. v. United States, 585 F.2d
783, 786 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[D]ue process requires that interested parties be
given a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of adverse parties and an
opportunity to meet them."). See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 64, at § 4.07.
67. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d
584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("Discretionary decisions should more often be sup-
ported with findings of facts and reasoned opinions." (footnote omitted)); Ge-
raud v. Schrader, 531 P.2d 872, 879 (Wyo. 1975) ("It is insufficient for an
administrative agency to state only an ultimate fact or conclusion, but each ul-
timate fact or conclusion must be thoroughly explained in order for a court to
determine upon what basis each ultimate fact or conclusion was reached."),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 904 (1975). See also Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal
Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. J. RFV. 1293, 1310
(1972); Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. Ci. L.
REv. 737, 790 (1976).
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hearings on an industrial development bond application,6 8 es-
pecially in light of the requirement that projects serve a public
purpose.
A procedural device that is indispensible to the success of
industrial development bond reform is the requirement of a
record.69 One commentator has noted that "[the cloak for ar-
bitrary decision-making is the absence of any command.., to
make a record. If little or nothing is put on the record by the
municipal agency, the less chance of reversal."70 A record can
thus insulate the decision-making process from determinations
based upon extrinsic factors by exposing their involvement to
the reviewing court.71 This requirement also facilitates effec-
tive judicial review of municipal determinations by providing a
reviewing court with the precise facts, findings, and reasons
upon which the municipality's decision rests.7 2 The reviewing
court can thereby better understand what it is reviewing, and
avoid speculation.7 3 The insistence on a record, therefore,
serves as a vital link to improving the system of judicial review
that has traditionally been the primary check on discretionary
municipal decision making.7 4
68. See, e.g., Bagby v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 186 Colo. 428, 434, 528 P.2d
1299, 1302 (1974) (Colorado statute prohibiting '"making final policy decisions or
taking formal action in other than a public meeting... [is] designed precisely
to prevent the abuse of 'secret' or 'star chamber sessions' of public bodies.");
Drew v. Insurance Comm'r & Treasurer, 330 So. 2d 794, 796 (Fla. App. 1976)
("An administrative proceeding should provide a citizen with a fair, open, and
impartial hearing." (footnote omitted)); Adams v. Marshall, 212 Kan. 595, 601,
512 P.2d 365, 371 (1973) ("[Pjroceedings of a judicial nature held behind closed
doors and shielded from public scrutiny have long been repugnant to our sys-
tem of justice."). See generally K. DAvis, supra note 64, § 4.06.
69. No equivalent to a formal record requirement for municipal procedure
exists presently in Minnesota. The only requirement that is remotely similar
requires only that a clerk maintain "a minute book, noting therein all proceed-
ings of the council." MtNN. STAT. § 412.151 (1980). These minutes are inade-
quate to serve as a record for judicial review, however, because exactness
comparable with judicial records is not mandated. See, e.g., Hokanson v. High
School Dist. No. Eight, 121 Ariz. 264, 268, 589 P.2d 907, 911 (Ct. App. 1979); Wal-
ters v. Validation of $3,750,000.00 School Bonds, 364 So. 2d 274, 276 (Miss. 1978);
Houman v. Mayor of Pompton Lakes, 155 N.J. Super. 129, 172, 382 A.2d 413, 435-
36 (1977); Op. Att'y Gen. 470c (Minn. Feb. 18, 1959). Because of this deficiency
in the record of municipal proceedings, it is necessary to incorporate the ad-
ministrative law procedure requiring a rulemaking record. See note 95 infra
and accompanying text.
70. R. BAcociK, supra note 55, at 159.
71. See, e.g., id.
72. See, e.g., RE. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 340
(Minn. 1978).
73. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 67, at 1310 (1972); Verkuil, supra note 67, at
790-91. See generally K. DAvis, supra note 64, § 16.07.
74. See notes 38-45 supra and accompanying text.
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In addition, the legislature should permit municipalities to
adopt local standards for industrial development bond determi-
nations.7 5 Local standards have the advantage of being more
flexible than the legislative standards approach,7 6 because local
conditions or preferences that may affect public purpose find-
ings can be incorporated into the standards.7 7 Properly formu-
lated standards could serve as a municipality's individualized
declaration of goals to be achieved with industrial development
bond projects.7 8 Prospective bond financing applicants could
thus have advance knowledge of a municipality's specific re-
quirements for industrial development bonding approval.7 9
More importantly, capricious municipal approval of projects
that do not conform to these standards would more readily be
exposed to the reviewing court.8 0
Imposition of this reform model may increase the cost of
industrial development bonds, or adversely affect the marketa-
bility of such bonds.81 In addition, municipalities may still find
75. These local standards would be most appropriate in cities that use in-
dustrial development bonding frequently. See Annual Repor, supra note 6
(listing amount and location of bond issues in Minnesota during the June 1977
through December 1978 period). Although these standards do not necessarily
have to reflect quantitative or class-based choices, see text accompanying notes
16-17 supra, they should be limiting criteria.
76. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
78. These standards could be effective only when concepts of "public pur-
pose" incorporated in the Minnesota Industrial Development Act are particu-
larized to reflect specific local conditions. See text accompanying note 21
supra.
79. See, e.g., Bruff, supra note 14, at 692.
80. If, for instance, local standards sought to promote compatibility be-
tween bond projects and the surrounding environment, and yet a nuisance-like
activity was approved for a residential area, a reviewing court would have rea-
son to question the judgment of the municipality.
81. One of the costs inherent in the proposed reform is incurred in produc-
ing a record of the proceedings. Such costs, however, could be paid out of the
proceeds of the bonds as reasonable incidental expenses to the issuance of the
bonds. See, e.g., Bell v. Board of Educ., 343 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Ky. 1961); First
Sewerage Dist. v. City Council, 215 La. 428, 444, 40 So. 2d 808, 814 (1949); Mayor
& Bd. of Alderman v. Engle, 211 Miss. 380, 395-96, 51 So. 2d 564, 570 (1951).
The effective judicial activity that could result from the proposed system of
reform may also be seen as affecting the marketability of industrial develop-
ment bonds. In a discussion on the effect litigation has on the marketability of
municipal bonds, one source notes that:
A municipal bond underwriter ... wants assurance that he is buying
bonds which are valid binding obligations of the issuer. Any challenge
of the validity of the bonds, even though it be without apparent merit,
raises a possibility that the bonds may be invalidated and may impair
or ruin the marketability of the bonds.
MuNIcIPAL FINANCE OFFICERS ASS'N OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, LEGAL
AND OTHER ASPECTS OF MuNIcIPAL DEBT RELATED TO MARKETING BoNDs: Nur-
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it difficult not to approve bond financing applications without
more direct federal or state limitations on bond issuance.82
These speculative costs and problems are, however, out-
weighed by the benefits that reform can achieve by improving
the structure of industrial development bonding at both the
municipal and judicial levels.
2. Impetus for the Model
Many of the recommendations for industrial development
bond reform correspond to mechanisms implemented to cure
the problems of administrative agencies. This similarity of
cures is inevitable since the problems of municipal decision
making in industrial development bonding resemble the
problems that existed in administrative agencies prior to the
adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).83 The
problems of pre-APA administrative agencies included "the
combination of judicial with executive or legislative functions
... [and] the lack of effective independent review or judicial
control of administrative decisions."84 Lack of clear structural
SANCE Surrs; No-LITIGATION CERTIFICATES 4, 5 (1958). Thus, it is contended that
the "less risk" that accompanies a bond, the more attractive the bond is to po-
tential purchasers. See id. Strict adherents to this philosophy may suggest
that from the standpoint of prospective bond purchasers, a legislative stan-
dards approach presents more predictability than judicial review as a means to
constrain expenditures for industrial development bonding. This suggestion,
however, is an inadequate short-term solution because its rigid approach to
eliminating abuses of industrial development bonding will effectively eliminate
the ability of local government units to respond to unique local conditions. See
notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text. Although effective judicial review
may cause some uncertainty at first, this effect will be minimized as municipal-
ities conform their decision making to considerations appropriate to public pur-
pose concepts. See, e.g., notes 95 & 105 infra. This solution, therefore, can
improve muncipal decision making while still allowing municipalities to exer-
cise discretion within reasonable limits.
82. See, e.g., Bergan, Industry's Bondage Fetish, THE WASHINGTON
MONTHLY, Jan. 1981, at 23 (suggesting that "[t]here is no reason to expect busi-
nesses to curb their appetites for [industrial development bonds] ... [n]or are
states and cities likely to slow the pace of [industrial development bond]
growth"); Controversy, supra note 4, at 72 (suggesting that the federal govern-
ment has an interest in regulating industrial development bonds, whereas cit-
ies use the bonds for "competitive reasons"); Greene, supra note 4, at 69
(suggesting that the states "might be better off" if the federal government re-
stricted industrial development bonds).
83. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
84. Report of the Special Comm. on Administrative Law, 61 A.B. REP.
720, 724 (1936). The American Bar Association (ABA) found especially dis-
turbing the "tendency to avoid making any [statutory] provision whatsoever
for judicial review, and, so far as possible, to avoid the possibility of such re-
view." Report of the Special Comm. on Administrative Law, 59 A.B.A. REP. 539,
547 (1934). At Congressional hearings for proposed administrative procedure
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separations of power,85 as well as inadequate judicial review of
decision making,8 6 also characterize the process involved in in-
dustrial development bonding. These similarities suggest that
the APA can serve as a useful guideline to implementing indus-
trial development bond reforms. 87
acts, members of the ABA argued that strict judicial review was necessary to
control the agencies. See generally Administrative Procedure: Hearings on S.
674, S. 675, & S. 918 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (pt. 3) 925-30 (1941) (testimony of Jacob Lashly); id. at 939-
42 (testimony of Thomas B. Gay); id. at 957-79 (testimony of 0. McGuire)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
The critique and recommendations of the ABA were disputed, in part, by
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. The Commit-
tee recommended against enlarging the factual inquiry -of the courts generally,
for "[d] issatisfaction with existing standards as to the scope. of judicial review
derives largely from dissatisfaction with the fact-finding procedures . . . em-
ployed by the administrative bodies." S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 92
(1941) [hereinafter cited as S. Doc. No. 8]. Changes in administrative fact-find-
ing procedures were recommended that would "inspire confidence and ... ob-
viate the reasons for change in the scope of judicial review." Id. at 92. See also
Hearings, supra (pt. 2) at 843-52 (testimony of Harry Shulman).
85. The requirement of separation of powers is generally held inapplicable
to municipalities. See, e.g., County of Mariposa v. Merced Irrigation Dist., 32
Cal. 2d 467, 476-77, 196 P.2d 920, 926 (1948); Flanigan v. Preferred Dev. Corp., 226
Ga. 267, 268, 174 S.E.2d 425, 426 (1970); Pressman v. D'Alesandro, 193 Md. 672,
679, 69 A.2d 453, 454 (1949). Municipal governing bodies are often small and uni-
cameral, see 1 C. ANTEAU, supra note 43, § 4.00; and are authorized to perform
both legislative and executive functions. See Shanley v. Jankura, 144 Conn. 694,
703, 137 A.2d 536, 541 (1957); Mara v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 24 N.J.
113, 119, 130 A.2d 828, 830 (1957); Myers v. Schiering, 27 Ohio St. 2d 11, 13, 271
N.E.2d 864, 865 (1971); Bruff, supra note 14, at 673, 693.
86. See notes 35-55 supra and accompanying text.
87. The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure ob-
served that:
Running through the criticisms of administrative procedure is the
desire to prevent either one of two major objectives from being fur-
thered by the sacrifice of the other. It is well recognized that the pur-
pose of Congress in creating or utilizing an administrative agency is to
further some public interest or policy which it has embodied in law
.... But everyone also recognizes that these public purposes are in-
tended to be advanced with impartial justice to all private interests in-
volved and with full recognition of the rights secured by law. Powers
must be effectively exercised in the public interest, but they must not
be arbitrarily exercised or exercised with partiality for some individu-
als and discrimination against others.
S. Doc. No. 8, supra note 84, at 2.
In examining the rulemaking process, the Committee noted the inadequacy
of the hearing process. In some agencies hearings were not required for the is-
suance of regulations. See S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (pt. 7) 65-67
(1941) (Bureau of Fisheries); id. (pt. 9) at 64-65 (Internal Revenue Service). In
others the hearing was held, but only after a decision had been reached. See
id. (pt. 2) at 7 (War Dept. Engineering Dept.). The Committee highlighted the
need to "improve, without rigidifying, the rule-making process by emphasizing
the importance of outside participation prior to the issuance of rules." S. Doc.
No. 8, supra note 84, at 6.
In framing its recommendations, the Committee observed that because ad-
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When a municipality enacts the measures contained in the
proposed legislative reform, principles of fairness and openness
should prevail.88 These principles could best be effectuated by
employing an informal rulemaking model similar to that in the
APA.89 Under this system, a municipality would be required to
publish notice of the proposed rulemaking,90 as well as provide
interested parties with the right to participate in the rulemak-
ing process. 91 Once a rule is promulgated, it must include a
concise general statement of its basis and purpose, 92 which will
serve as a statement of reasons that will help a reviewing court
judge the rationality of the rule and determine whether the
rule conforms to statutory authority.93
Although the informal rulemaking model presents the least
ministrative agencies investigate and make discretionary choices within an
area of specialization, S. Doc. No. 8, supra note 84, at 101-02, and because mem-
bers bring background knowledge and expertise to bear on performance of
their tasks, id. at 19, yet need to learn the viewpoints of those affected in order
properly to make the choices, id. at 101, the procedures followed should be
"systematically and specifically" directed toward eliciting facts, id. at 102, espe-
cially from those directly and financially affected by the decisions. Id. To the
extent that members of a municipal government have expert knowledge of lo-
cal conditions, see note 29 supra and accompanying text, and have discretion to
decide whether approval of industrial development bonding is desirable for the
community and in furtherance of the purposes of the Industrial Development
Act, see MmN. STAT. § 474.03 (1980), the rulemaking guidelines of the APA may
be adapted to the procedures of bonding decisions. Municipal governments, of
course, differ from administrative agencies in that the former are representa-
tive bodies. This distinction does not vitiate the importance of improving the
fact-finding procedure. At most it suggests that the fact-finding procedures
adopted by a municipality may more readily be patterned after a legislative
model. See S. Doc. No. 8, supra note 84, at 101-02.
88. To some extent, municipal procedures are required by statute to be
open. See MmN. STAT. § 471.705 (1980). See also Wickham, Let the Sun Shine
In. Open-Meeting Legislation Can Be Our Key to Closed Doors in State and Lo-
cal Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 480, 480 n.2 (1973) (various state statutes).
Therefore, to avoid an overlap between existing municipal procedures and pro-
posed administrative procedures, the legislature could incorporate the adminis-
trative procedures into the municipal procedures when the municipal
procedures are deficient.
89. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
90. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976). Under the APA, notice must include a
statement of the time, place, and nature of the proceedings, a reference to the
legal authority under which the rule is proposed, and the terms of the proposed
rule.
91. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976). Although the APA indicates that inter-
ested parties have only the right to participate in the informal rulemaking pro-
cess by submitting written data or argument, it would be preferable to require
public hearings in addition to these procedures because of the public nature of
the issue involved in industrial development bonds. See note 10 supra and ac-
companying text.
92. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
93. See, e.g., Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330,
338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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cumbersome procedure, the necessity of a record94 suggests
that the informal rulemaking on-the-rulemaking-record model
should be used by a municipality when it makes a determina-
tion on a request for industrial development bonding.95 The
purpose of using this model is to maintain the simplicity, flex-
ibility, and efficiency of notice-and-comment proceedings while
also producing more manageable and focused records for judi-
cial review.96
B. JUDIcIAL REVIEW UNDER THE MODEL
The scope of review of actions under the APA provides a
useful guideline for judicial review of locally adopted proce-
94. See notes 70-74 supra and accompanying text.
95. The informal rulemaking on-the-rulemaking-record model of adminis-
trative procedure is of relatively recent origin. One commentator reasons that
this hybrid rulemaking model was a Congressional response to the inadequa-
cies of the traditional model of rulemaking:
Notice-and-comment rulemaking has often been praised as provid-
ing a fair and efficient procedure. The basic theory underlying these
procedures seems unquestionably sound .... There are problems
with notice-and-comment rulemaking, however, that may be traced to a
recurring problem of the administrative process: the apparent insensi-
tivity of agencies to communications addressed to them. A person ad-
versely affected in some serious way by a proposed rule may find little
solace in the opportunity to submit a written comment....
Congress becomes the battleground for these opposing views when
a new statute granting rulemaking authority is being considered. To a
surprising extent, Congress has been sympathetic to the fears ex-
pressed by persons who may be subject to regulation under a broad
grant of rulemaking authority.
Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The
Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALF. L.
REv. 1276, 1313-14 (1972).
Although this new "on-the-rulemaking-record" requirement is to be distin-
guished from the formal trial-type procedures associated with the "on-the-rec-
ord" requirement of § 553(c) of the APA, see 1 K. DAVIS, ADMnISTATIVE LAw
TREATISE § 6:4 (2d ed. 1978), the "rulemaking record" requirement has also
served to replace the "focused and defined record" of the adjudicatory process,
which has been more or less displaced because of the current popularity of
rulemaking. Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 87 YALE L.T.
38, 61 (1975). The need for a record in informal rulemaking has been consid-
ered essential to "an alternative structure for administrative action which can
provide a satisfactory framework both for agency decisions and for judicial re-
view." Id. at 88. See also Hamilton, supra, at 1333; Verkuil, supra note 67, at
248; Note, The Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements for Agency
Rulemaking, 87 HARv. L, REv. 782, 804-05 (1974). Pedersen suggested that the
"increased importance of informal rulemalking" dictated that: 'The time has
come to adopt procedures for rulemaking in which a formal record plays a cen-
tral role .... The adoption of this change would make rulemaking a more effi-
cient and less arbitrary method for government policymaking." Pedersen,
supra, at 88.
96. See Hamilton, supra note 95, at 1313-14; Pedersen, supra note 95, at 61;
Verkuil, supra note 67, at 187; Note, supra note 95, at 785.
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dures and standards for industrial development bonding, and
for review of municipal determinations to grant or deny such
financing. When a municipality enacts procedures and stan-
dards that are similar to those of the informal rulemaking
model, the concomitant "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review should be applied.9 7 A municipality's performance of
this "quasi-legislative" function results in a reviewing court be-
ing "limited to determining whether there was a rational basis
for the [decision] and whether the [municipality conformed to]
statutory authority."98
A higher standard of review-substantial evidence-should
be required for specific municipal decisions concerning individ-
ual projects, however; these decisions must be made on the rec-
ord, in a manner similar to the process used in administrative
decisions made on-the-rulemaking-record. 99 Judicial review in
these circumstances focuses on the record, scrutinizing the mu-
nicipality's reasoning "from matters in the record to ultimate
factual conclusions." 0 0 For a court to affirm a municipality's
decision, it must conclude that the municipality "acted within
the scope of its authority."01 The court must then determine
that the municipality "could have reasonably believed in the
factual premise" underlying its decision and that the decision
"was based on a 'consideration of the relevant factors.' "102 FJ
nally, the court must conclude that the municipality followed
97. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1976). See also Verkuil, supra note 67, at 205-06.
98. Verkuil, supra note 67, at 206. Although this mode of deferential review
presents problems similar to those involved in traditional judicial review of mu-
nicipal expenditures, see notes 38-54 supra and accompanying text, application
of Dillon's rule to a carefully detailed directive from the legislature as to what
standards and procedures are appropriate for industrial development bonding
should confine municipal discretion within acceptable limits. See text accom-
panying note 42 supra.
99. The substantial evidence standard "has become synonymous with ac-
tive judicial review and is frequently contrasted with the 'arbitrary and capri-
cious' standard usually associated with 'soft' judicial review." Verkuil, supra
note 67, at 214 (footnote omitted). A requirement of substantial evidence re-
view in informal rulemaking does not, however, mean that the rules must be
made on the record in accordance with the trial-type procedures of formal
rulemaking. See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 239-46
(1973); note 95 supra.
100. Gifford, Administrative Rulemaking and Judicial Review: Some Con-
ceptual Models, 65 MJmN. L. REv. 63, 73 (1980) (describing judicial review of ad-
ministrative agency decisions). See also Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499
F.2d 467, 472-74 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United
States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973); Pedersen, supra note
95, at 48-50; Verkuil, supra note 67, at 222-26, 247-48.
101. Gifford, supra note 100, at 73 n.47 (describing review of agency action).
102. Id. at 73 n.47 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 416-17 (1971)).
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correct procedures in reaching its decision.103 Adherence to
this review standard would promote effective judicial review by
eliminating the fallacious deference that traditionally has ac-
companied rationality review of industrial development bond
determinations.104 Moreover, this heightened standard of re-
view would give municipalities an additional incentive to im-
prove their decision-making processes.105
IV. CONCLUSION
The increased use of unrestrained municipal power to is-
sue industrial development bonds has caused the Minnesota
legislature to redefine the limits of the exercise of that power.
Through the substantive standards in the recent amendment to
the Minnesota Municipal Industrial Development Act, the legis-
lature has prohibited the use of industrial development bond-
ing for certain types of projects. This legislative standards
approach unnecessarily restricts municipal discretion, which is
essential for the Act's success. Despite this problem, the
amendment to the Act does significantly improve the procedu-
ral requirements for the issuance of industrial development
bonds. Nevertheless, analysis of these recent procedural
changes suggests that the legislation does not provide for effec-
tive judicial review and thus does not prevent arbitrary local
government decision making.
Additional reforms are needed to resolve these remaining
problems. The substance-limiting approach of the recent
amendment to the Act should be replaced with a procedural
approach that opens the decision-making process and reveals
the basis of municipal decisions without unnecessarily restrict-
ing a local government's discretion. In addition, judicial review
must be made more effective by requiring that industrial devel-
opment bond determinations be made on a record. This re-
quirement, in conjunction with additional procedural reforms,
can enhance both municipal decision making and judicial re-
view of those determinations.
103. See Gifford, supra note 100, at 73 n.47.
104. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
105. The imposition of a higher standard of review in informal rulemaking,
by the requirement that a determination must be supported by substantial evi-
dence in the record as a whole, was the means Congress used to make agencies
more responsive to their constituencies. See note 95 supra. The threat of
heightened judicial scrutiny in industrial development bonding would presum-
ably have the same effect on municipal procedures.
[Vol. 65:961
